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ABSTRACT

Byzantine Fault Tolerance (BFT) has been a major subject of study over the last
two decades with increasing societal dependance on secure, correct, and reliable
computer systems and online services. This research presents a model for high-level
optimization of emerging systems that rely on these BFT algorithms and use a variable
numbers of decision nodes. The model highlights the relationship between the security of
a system and its efficiency. Two experiments were performed to determine system
performance by varying the number of compromised nodes, decision nodes, and total
nodes. They examine the probability that a transaction will be compromised based on
these variables using hypergeometric distribution, a subset of combinatorics. It was found
that the compromise probability follows predictable patterns, with certain combinations
of decision nodes performing better than others. The results show a trichotomous
relationship where one in every three decision nodes results in lower security risk than its
neighbors. The purpose of this model is to assist system developers in deciding how to
best construct their systems to improve security while minimizing resource usage.
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1. INTRODUCTION

This research explores the optimization of Byzantine Fault Tolerant (BFT)
systems to reduce resource usage while maintaining a level of security. Byzantine Fault
Tolerance was first proposed in 1978 as a method of achieving a consensus in a computer
network even if some of the network nodes were faulty (Lamport et al., 1982). A network
achieving consensus means that its nodes have come to an agreement with a high degree
of certainty that the information being transferred is correct and has not been duplicated
or tampered with. This problem of network consensus in the face of faulty system nodes
was initially named the interactive consistency problem before being renamed the
Byzantine General’s problem by the same authors.
The Byzantine General’s problem puts this issue into the context of a general
from the byzantine era who is attempting to conquer a city. The general commands
several companies surrounding the city, each led by a captain. For the city to be taken, all
surrounding companies must attack at the same time. The general must send messages to
the surrounding forces to ensure that they will attack at the designated time. In this
problem, the captains are the system nodes who must reply to the general so that he may
determine if they are all in consensus with the success of the attack being synonymous
with the success of the system. Figure 1.1 is an example of when four of the six captains
(light colored) are confirmed to attack at the designated time and two captains (dark
colored) are unconfirmed.
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Figure 1.1 Byzantine General’s Problem

This problem introduces nuances such as certain captains being traitors and
willfully returning false replies or messengers being captured along their routes. In Figure
1.1, these are represented by the dark colored, unconfirmed captains. This translates to
network systems as compromised nodes returning faulty decisions or nodes being unable
to reply due to issues with maintenance or network communication. Nodes with these
problems are said to have “Byzantine Faults”. The BFT algorithm was able to overcome
these faults if fewer than one third of the nodes were affected.
This method was improved upon by Castro and Lizkov (1999) who introduced
Practical Byzantine Fault Tolerance (PBFT) which performed well in asynchronous
environments and can be used to build highly available systems (Konnov et al., 1999).
This method provides secure consensus and proactive recovery methods to recover faulty
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nodes over the system lifetime, reducing the time that any single faulty node can
contribute to consensus disruption (Castro & Liskov, 2002). These algorithms were still
considered brand-new with little testing to prove that it merited implementation (Nair et
al., 2020; Sternberg et al., 2020) in 2008 when Bitcoin and Blockchain technology was
introduced. . Bitcoin used BFT to create the first public Blockchain network, reducing
energy costs paid by system administrators by allowing anyone to act as a system node.
The potential for malicious behavior was mitigated by requiring nodes to provide “Proof
of Work”, requiring them to compute complex algorithms to even be allowed into a
decision-making process with a reward for participating in decisions (Ghosh & Das,
2020).The main draw of these Blockchain systems is their record keeping capabilities.
Once a decision has been made to add data into the system, it is encoded as a block in a
digital ledger and stored publicly on all nodes so that it can later be analyzed to ensure
that no node attempted to change the data in that ledger. Blockchain systems use BFT to
obtain a consensus and then write it into an immutable ledger, but not all BFT systems
use the same record-keeping methodology (Zhao, 2009). Although Blockchain systems
are the most well-known BFT systems, they are not the only. BFT algorithms can be used
for any system that requires high levels of security in its decision-making processes. The
algorithms are useful for many Web-based systems that require higher levels of security
in their messaging processes, and can be implemented to help these systems meet reliable
messaging standards (Zhao, 2009).
Some common problems BFT systems encounter are those of excessive energy
consumption and high latency times (Nair et al., 2020; Sedlmeir et al., 2020). To achieve
the level of security provided by BFT algorithms, a system typically relies on many
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nodes running in parallel to achieve a single consensus. Reducing the number of nodes
performing calculations creates a tradeoff between security and energy consumption.
The second problem is long latency times, caused by the algorithms being run on each
node to ensure the security of the messages transmitted in the system. As the number of
nodes performing calculations increases, the traffic on the network increases causing
congestion and increased latency times to send messages. This increases the amount of
time nodes wait for messages to be delivered, contributing to the energy consumption of
the system and increasing the time it takes to achieve a consensus.
Power consumption and latency issues have been a focus of research for BFT
systems. Different Blockchain types have been developed to optimize the systems for
these two issues based on their respective needs (Da Silva et al., 2019; Franke et al.,
2020; Vizier & Gramoli, 2020; Y. Wang, 2019). Various internet systems utilizing BFT
algorithms have attempted to improve these issues for their purposes, but Blockchains
has received a majority of the research focus since the rise of Bitcoin.
The two most prominent types of Blockchain systems are Public and Private.
Public Blockchains, like Bitcoin, allow any person to participate in consensus. The added
security risk of allowing anyone to participate is mitigated through requiring that person
to provide some proof that they will not tamper with the consensus. This is achieved by
requiring a person’s node/computer to run complex algorithms to achieve a Proof of
Work. This is based on the idea that the person now has an investment of energy and time
contributed to the consensus and will therefore be motivated to provide a good decision
for consensus (Ghosh & Das, 2020). Another motivator in this process is a small reward
for their service, in the case of Bitcoin this comes in the form of a small monetary reward
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in Bitcoins. This method places the burden of energy consumption on the unaffiliated
parties but still pulls a large amount of power from the national grid. One study estimated
that, over one year, power consumption from Bitcoin processes in the U.S. alone were
equivalent to a small country (Nair et al., 2020). The energy consumption of Proof of
Work methods has led others to attempt other methods, such as Proof of X, a template
term for any other type of proof which attempts to attain the same results but with the
idea of improving energy usage and scalability (Franke et al., 2020). The currently
accepted best alternative to Proof of Work is Proof of Stake, which selects nodes from
users with stake in the Blockchain and its integrity. This method is considered to be an
improvement over Proof of Work, although it has not been thoroughly tested(Franke et
al., 2020).
Private Blockchains skirt the energy requirements of Proof of Work by way of
only allowing trusted, pre-approved nodes on their networks. This method requires far
less energy as the complex algorithms no longer need to be run (F. Wang et al., 2021).
Private Blockchains are also used for private companies to secure their transaction
records without the public ledger provided by Public Blockchains. This research focuses
on Private Decentralized Blockchains as they consist of a set of controlled nodes, each
capable of returning a decision.
When first introduced BFT systems have consisted of a set number of nodes
capable of returning decisions to reach a secure consensus. These nodes are consistent,
and the same nodes are used in each consensus. Recently, systems such as the Redbelly
Blockchain have been introduced to utilize a far larger pool of nodes (Concurrent
Systems Research Group, University of Sydney, n.d.). In these systems, not all nodes are
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used in each consensus. This allows several decision-making processes to be run
concurrently, reducing latency times as more decisions can be made at once. This
development is only useful if different nodes are used to create pools of nodes each time.
These systems constantly switch between which nodes in the pool are selected for each
group every time a consensus is reached. Figure 1.2 displays a sample distributed
network setup with twelve total nodes and two Byzantine Fault nodes.

Figure 1.2 Example Node Pool with Sample Decision Node Groups
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The nodes in this example are grouped into decision groups of six where two
faulty nodes in a decision group are enough to cause the consensus to fail. The blue
outlined group shows a selection of nodes where the single faulty node would not prevent
the consensus from succeeding, and the red group shows a selection where both faulty
nodes are included, and the consensus is disrupted.
The Redbelly Blockchain was not the only attempt this method of varying
decision nodes. The ComChain system was introduced to develop a type of Private
Blockchain system called a Communal Blockchain, which uses a “Configuration block”
to determine which nodes are called upon for the next consensus(Vizier & Gramoli,
2020). The Honey Badger BFT Protocol is another method that focusing on adding
system capabilities to run transactions asynchronously, drastically reducing latency times
(Miller et al., 2016).
The goal of this research is to analyze different combinations of total nodes (𝑁𝑡 ),
decision nodes (𝑁𝑑 ), and compromised nodes (𝑁𝑐 ), to determine combinations that
reduce the chance of selecting too many faulty nodes, compromising the system. The R
programming language was used to create a model that processes the different
combinations of variables to determine the probability that consensus will be
compromised for any combination of nodes, while energy consumption is primarily based
on the number of decision nodes running per consensus. The model compares the
compromise chance to the number of decision nodes to allow system architects to make
informed choices on how many 𝑁𝑑 to include in their consensus processes to balance
security and energy consumption.
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This research consists of two parts. The first experiment examines the effect on
the security of a distributed network by changing the number of 𝑁𝑐 in the network while
holding the number of 𝑁𝑑 and 𝑁𝑡 constant. The second experiment examines the effect of
changing the number of 𝑁𝑑 in the network while holding the number of compromised and
𝑁𝑡 constant.
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2. METHODS

The three variables describing this model are 𝑁𝑡 , 𝑁𝑑 , and 𝑁𝑐 . A node is an actor in
the network with the power to return a decision to be used in consensus. The number of
nodes available to the network for use in consensus is 𝑁𝑡 . 𝑁𝑑 are those nodes selected for
each individual consensus out of the pool of 𝑁𝑡 . 𝑁𝑐 are those that do not return any
decision or incorrect information due to either the node being hacked and malicious, or
defective due to maintenance issues with the nodes or the information lines connecting
the nodes. For example, consider a distributed network consisting of 100 nodes capable
of returning a decision, 10 of those nodes are called upon to provide a decision for a
consensus, 4 nodes have been hacked and are malicious, and 3 nodes are down for
maintenance issues but have not yet been taken off the active list in the pool. In this
scenario, the 𝑁𝑡 are the 100, the number of 𝑁𝑑 is 10, and the number of 𝑁𝑐 is 7 (4
malicious and 3 down).
In both experiments run, the primary statistic observed is the probability of
consensus disruption. It is assumed that the system cannot distinguish the 𝑁𝑐 from the
properly functioning nodes when selecting 𝑁𝑑 from the pool. Thus, there exists a chance
to select compromised nodes when selecting 𝑁𝑑 . The BFT algorithm dictates that a
consensus can only be disrupted if greater than (𝑁𝑑 -1)/3 nodes are compromised (Castro
& Liskov, 2002; Lamport et al., 1982). In this model, this threshold number required to
disrupt a consensus is denoted by the variable k. This variable is static in the first
experiment and will become dynamic in the second experiment where the number of 𝑁𝑑
is varied across each experimental run.
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An important distinction is that disruption of a consensus is not the same as
compromise of a consensus. A consensus being disrupted means that it cannot reach a
secure decision due to not enough responses being uniform. This can happen due to null
responses received from nodes down for maintenance who cannot return a decision, or
dissenting decisions received from malicious nodes. A consensus compromise can only
occur from greater than two thirds of the 𝑁𝑑 being malicious and returning dissenting
decisions. Null decisions cannot contribute to proper consensus or compromised
consensus, only disruption. Disruption of consensus is statistically more likely to occur
than compromise, so it will be the focus of these experiments.
The probability of compromised consensus could be modeled in a similar manner
to the methods in this research. One method would be calculated by setting the k value to
one third of the 𝑁𝑑 and finding the probability that consensus would be successful or
disrupted, and then inverting. This method would give success and disruption probability
collectively as it would not distinguish between the system properly functioning and
failing but not compromised. Alternatively, it could be done by changing the k value to
be two thirds of the 𝑁𝑑 and inverting the locations of malicious and non-malicious nodes
in the combinatorics equations.

2.1. EXPERIMENT 1
The first experiment in this study holds the number of 𝑁𝑑 and 𝑁𝑡 constant while
varying the number of 𝑁𝑐 to observe how the probability of disruption changes. A
program written in R programming language (Appendix A) was created allowing 𝑁𝑑 and
𝑁𝑡 to be set to any numbers so long as 𝑁𝑑 is less than 𝑁𝑡 . The algorithm is as follows:
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1.

The number of decision (𝑁𝑑 ) and 𝑁𝑡 are set for the particular experiment.

2.

𝑁𝑐 is set to 0.

3.

While 𝑁𝑐 <=𝑁𝑡
a.

the program determines the probability density of the
hypergeometric distribution using the dhyper function in R.
i.

The probability of selecting a value of 𝑁𝑐 less than k is
calculated, then repeated for all values less than k.

ii.

These values are then summed to find the probability of
secure consensus, then inverted to obtain the probability of
compromise.

b.
4.

Set 𝑁𝑐 =𝑁𝑐 +1

The resulting data is plotted showing the relationship between Nc and
compromise probability and the trends as Nc increases.

The dhyper function in R takes in the number of total items (𝑁𝑡 ) and splits it into
two types, in our case the two types are 𝑁𝑑 and 𝑁𝑐 (Team,2021). The function then
determines the likelihood that a specific value of 𝑁𝑐 will be chosen out of the total.
However, the likelihood that a specific number is chosen does not indicate how likely it is
that a consensus will be compromised. To determine the probability of disruption, the
probability density is calculated for each potential number of disrupted nodes less than
but not equal to k. These probabilities are then summed to give the final probability value
that the consensus in question will not be disrupted, then inverted to obtain the
probability of compromise. This increases efficiency as the number of iterations required
to find the probability of secure consensus is less than would be required to find the
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probability of compromise. This process repeats for each combination of 𝑁𝑑 , 𝑁𝑡 , and 𝑁𝑐
to determine how the probability of compromise changes as the number of disrupted
nodes increases.

2.2. EXPERIMENT 2
The second experiment varies 𝑁𝑑 while 𝑁𝑡 and 𝑁𝑐 are held constant. The R
program also uses the dhyper function to find the probability density of the
hypergeometric distribution. In this experiment the variable 𝑁𝑑 is changed, but as the k
value is based solely on 𝑁𝑑 its value is expected to impact the results to an observable
extent. The algorithm for this second experiment is as follows:
1.

The number of 𝑁𝑐 and 𝑁𝑡 are set. for the particular experiment.

2.

𝑁𝑑 is set to 5

3.

While 𝑁𝑑 <=𝑁𝑡
a.

the program determines the probability density of the
hypergeometric distribution using the dhyper function.
i.

The probability of selecting a number of 𝑁𝑐 less than k is
calculated, then repeated for all values less than k.

ii.

These values are then summed to find the probability of
secure consensus, then inverted to obtain the probability of
compromise.

b.
4.

Set 𝑁𝑑 =𝑁𝑑 +1

The resulting data is plotted showing the relationship between 𝑁𝑑 and
compromise probability and the trends as 𝑁𝑑 increases.
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First, 𝑁𝑡 and 𝑁𝑐 are entered. Then the iterations begin by taking the number of 𝑁𝑑
and calculating the k value. 𝑁𝑑 is initialized to 5, as using any less is impractical for
newer BFT systems (Miller et al., 2016). The three main variables and k are used in the
dhyper function to obtain the probability of picking between 0 and k-1 disrupted nodes
out of the 𝑁𝑑 . Picking fewer than k compromised nodes results in a secure consensus, so
the value is inverted to obtain the probability of disruption. This process is performed in
this manner as it requires fewer iterations. The next iteration then begins with the next
number of 𝑁𝑑 , and this continues until the number of 𝑁𝑑 equals the number of 𝑁𝑡 . The
probability of compromise for each respective number of 𝑁𝑑 is then charted so that trends
and patterns can be determined.

2.3. ANALYSIS
Once the results are obtained, they will be analyzed for patterns. For experiment
1, the controlled variables are 𝑁𝑑 and 𝑁𝑡 . 𝑁𝑑 is initialized to a low value and increase
while 𝑁𝑡 is constant to observe pattern changes. Then 𝑁𝑡 will be increased to observe
pattern changes and analyzed for potential proportional relationships.
For the second experiment, Nc is initialized as a low percentage of 𝑁𝑡 and is
increased to observe patterns in the results. Once this is complete, any points of interest
will be examined. Then the experiment will be run again at higher proportions of Nc to
𝑁𝑡 to observe any changes in patterns.
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3. RESULTS

3.1. EXPERIMENT 1 RESULTS
The first experiment examined the consensus disruption chance changes with
varying 𝑁𝑐 while 𝑁𝑑 and 𝑁𝑡 are held constant. Figure 3.1 shows the results obtained
using 38 𝑁𝑑 and 100 𝑁𝑡 .

Figure 3.1 Comparison of Disruption Chance to Number of Compromised Nodes using
38 Decision Nodes out of 100 Total Nodes
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The results show that the trends follow a logistical curve. The initial probabilities
on the lower left remains at a zero percent chance of disruption until 𝑁𝑐 reaches 13. This
is due to the k value being 13 when using 38 𝑁𝑑 , making it impossible to disrupt a
consensus with 12 or fewer. The opposite end at the top right reaches a nearly flat pattern
when 50 𝑁𝑐 are in the network. From this point, this line slowly approaches a 100%
disruption chance until there are 75 𝑁𝑐 , in which case the line reaches 100% and remains
there as it is impossible to choose less than 13 𝑁𝑐 out of the 38 when 75 or greater 𝑁𝑡 are
compromised. To show how changing the number of 𝑁𝑑 alters the curve, Figure 3.2
displays the results of using only 10 𝑁𝑑 while still maintaining a total pool of 100 𝑁𝑡 .
Altering 𝑁𝑑 changes the curve significantly, mainly in the position along the x-axis.
Figure 3.3 shows the effect of changing 𝑁𝑡 to fifty while keeping the 𝑁𝑑 at 10. We see
that the curves in Figures 3.2 and 3.3 are similar in shape. This is due to a proportional
relationship between the number of 𝑁𝑡 and 𝑁𝑐 . The number of 𝑁𝑡 is halved, but the
disruption chance does not change for the same ½ proportioned number of 𝑁𝑐 .

3.2. EXPERIMENT 2 RESULTS
In the second experiment the number of disrupted nodes and 𝑁𝑡 remain constant,
and the disruption chance is calculated while iterating the number of 𝑁𝑑 used. This is
synonymous with a user taking a given value of 𝑁𝑡 and estimate the highest number of
down or 𝑁𝑐 their system might have before it is noticed and acted upon. Using these
results, they could then determine the best number of 𝑁𝑑 to use to minimize the chance of
transaction disruption.
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Figure 3.2 Comparison of Disruption Chance to Number of Compromised Nodes using
10 Decision Nodes out of 100 Total Nodes

Figure 3.3 Comparison of Disruption Chance to Number of Compromised Nodes using
10 Decision Nodes out of 50 Total Nodes
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First, a simulation is run using a low number of 𝑁𝑐 . The initial chart is obtained
using 100 𝑁𝑡 where 10 of those nodes are compromised. The results are shown in Figure
3.4.

Figure 3.4 Comparison of Disruption Chance to Number of Decision Nodes using 10
Compromised Nodes out of 100 Total Nodes

Figure 3.4 shows a steep decline early in the data. This trend flattens out at around
20 𝑁𝑑 until it reaches 0 at 32, where 10 𝑁𝑐 can no longer have any chance of disrupting
consensus. The early data is of particular interest as it shows that the trend is not linear as
the charts in the first experiment. Another chart is created using 25 𝑁𝑐 and 100 𝑁𝑡 to
observe the changes in the pattern as the 𝑁𝑐 are increased and the results shown in Figure
3.5.
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Figure 3.5 Comparison of Disruption Chance to Number of Decision Nodes using 25
Compromised Nodes out of 100 Total Nodes

Figure 3.6 Comparison of Disruption Chance to Number of Decision Nodes using 33
Compromised Nodes out of 100 Total Nodes
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The results in Figure 3.5 show a pronounced trichotomous pattern. The downward
slope has also elongated, not reaching 0 until 76 𝑁𝑑 are examined, where the 25 𝑁𝑐 can
no longer disrupt consensus. Next the effect of 33 𝑁𝑐 out of 100 𝑁𝑡 was examined. This
number is of particular interest as it is the k value of the number of the 𝑁𝑡 . The results of
using 33 𝑁𝑐 out of 100 𝑁𝑡 are shown in Figure 3.6.
Figure 3.6 shows a pronounced trichotomous nature in the results. The lines do
not converge to a 0% disruption chance but diverge as the value of 𝑁𝑑 approaches 100.
This likely indicates that this is the point at which the trends in disruption chance change
from converging at 0 to converging at 1. To confirm this, we examine the immediate
neighbors, 32 and 34 𝑁𝑐 (Figures 3.7 and 3.8 respectively).
It can be seen that just below the 33 compromised node point, the results
converge at 0, and above the point they converge at 1. Figure 3.9 shows the results of
using 50 𝑁𝑐 out of 100 total. These results show that the trends in Disruption Chance
continue to rise more steeply as 𝑁𝑐 increases past 33.
The trichotomous nature of the results requires additional explanation. The groups
that form these lines are characterized by their results for taking the number of nodes
modulo 3. The middle line is 𝑁𝑑 modulo 3 = 0 (6,9,12, etc.), the top line is 𝑁𝑑 modulo 3 =
1 (7,10,13, etc.), and the bottom line is 𝑁𝑑 modulo 3 = 2 (8,11,14, etc.). The three lines
formed in the results are most pronounced in Figure 3.6. That Figure has been broken
down and each group charted individually as shown in Figures 3.10, 3.11, and 3.12.
These Figures show that the best results are always obtained using the Modulo3=2 group
(Figure 3.12) and the worst results are the Modulo3=1 group (Figure 3.10).
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Figure 3.7 Comparison of Disruption Chance to Number of Decision Nodes using 32
Compromised Nodes out of 100 Total Nodes

Figure 3.8 Comparison of Disruption Chance to Number of Decision Nodes using 34
Compromised Nodes out of 100 Total Nodes
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Figure 3.9 Comparison of Disruption Chance to Number of Decision Nodes using 50
Compromised Nodes out of 100 Total Nodes

Figure 3.10 Comparison of Disruption Chance to Number of Decision Nodes of the
Mod3=0 group using 33 Compromised Nodes out of 100 Total Nodes
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Figure 3.11 Comparison of Disruption Chance to Number of Decision Nodes of the
Mod3=1 group using 33 Compromised Nodes out of 100 Total Nodes

Figure 3.12 Comparison of Disruption Chance to Number of Decision Nodes of the
Mod3=2 group using 33 Compromised Nodes out of 100 Total Nodes
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The trichotomous nature of these node combinations makes a direct comparison
impossible, as increasing both compromised and 𝑁𝑡 exactly proportionately has varied
results. If the value of 𝑁𝑐 is increased from 33 to 66, then a value of 199 and not 200
should be used for 𝑁𝑡 . This is due to each k value pertaining to 3 decision node values. In
the case of 33 𝑁𝑐 , this is the k value for 98, 99, and 100 𝑁𝑑 with 100 falling in the
Modulo3=1 group. When examining 66 𝑁𝑐 , the corresponding decision node values are
197, 198, and 199 with 199 falling in the Modulo3=1 group. So, a better comparison
exists between 33 𝑁𝑐 out of 100 total, and 66 𝑁𝑐 out of 199 total. The results of 66
compromised and 199 𝑁𝑡 are shown in Figure 3.13.

Figure 3.13 Comparison of Disruption Chance to Number of Decision Nodes using 66 𝑁𝑐
out of 199 Total Nodes

Figure 3.13 displays the same behavior as Figure 3.6 with a small discrepancy.
The top two lines (Mod3=1 and Mod3=0) have a decreased average value and the bottom
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line (Mod3=2) has an increased average value. Results were obtained from using higher
numbers of compromised and 𝑁𝑡 comparable to the previous sets and the resulting
average values of each Mod group is tabulated in Table 3.1.

Table 3.1 Average Modulo Group Values of Proportionately Increasing Node Sets
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4. DISCUSSION

4.1. TRENDS IN EXPERIMENT 1 RESULTS
The first experiment was run to see how network performance of a predetermined
system set up of 𝑁𝑑 and 𝑁𝑡 is affected by changes in the value of 𝑁𝑐 . In the results, we
observe a logistical curve. The line holds at zero until 𝑁𝑐 increase past the k value of the
𝑁𝑑 , when they become capable of disrupting a consensus. The compromise probability
raises rapidly past this point.
We also observe in the results that increasing the number of 𝑁𝑑 pushes the curve
further along the x-axis so that a larger number of 𝑁𝑐 is required to achieve the same
disruption chance compared to situations with a lower value of 𝑁𝑑 and equal 𝑁𝑡 .
Increasing the value of 𝑁𝑑 to decrease disruption probability is nothing new, this is
widely accepted to be an effective method of increasing security. But this is not the best
method of optimization as increasing the value of 𝑁𝑑 is the largest contributor to
increased energy cost and latency times.
Increasing the value of 𝑁𝑑 and the total number of nodes by proportionate
amounts increases the value of 𝑁𝑐 required to achieve similar levels of compromise
probability. This means that, if run concurrently, a system could run more transactions
simultaneously, the energy cost and latency times per transaction would not increase, and
disruption probability would decrease.
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4.2. TRENDS IN EXPERIMENT 2 RESULTS
Note the three groups formed in each graph in the second part of the simulations.
Here, the disrupted nodes and 𝑁𝑡 are held constant, and the disruption chance is
calculated for each possible value of 𝑁𝑑 . These three groups are characterized by their
number of 𝑁𝑑 modulo 3. The bottom line (best result) is where decision node modulo 3
is 2, the middle is 1, and the top (worst result) is 0. This is explained by the picking
probability and the number of disrupted nodes required to disrupt a transaction.
Consider the disruption chance for a transaction when values of 5, 6, and 7 are
used for 𝑁𝑑 . The modulo 3 results for these numbers are 2,0, and 1 respectively, so from
left to right they represent the bottom, middle and top lines, or best, moderate, and worst
results. The reason that using 5 𝑁𝑑 results in the lowest disruption chance is that 2
disrupted nodes are required to disrupt this transaction, where 2 nodes are also able to
disrupt a transaction using both 6 and 7 𝑁𝑑 . When the chosen number of 𝑁𝑑 increases
from 5, each additional decision node increases the chance of selecting a disrupted node,
and therefore the chance of disrupting the transaction. This pattern is observable in each
set of three numbers as the value of 𝑁𝑑 increases.

4.3. PROPORTIONAL TRENDS
Most of the results show that the disruption chance converges to 0 at high values
of 𝑁𝑑 if the number of disrupted nodes is below one third the total number of nodes, and
that it converges at 1 if the number of disrupted nodes is above one third. The only
exception being if the number of disrupted nodes is exactly one third the number of 𝑁𝑡 .
This research shows the best number of nodes to use in a transaction with given total and

27
𝑁𝑑 and assumed disrupted nodes. Here, it is assumed that lower numbers of 𝑁𝑑 are best
for the system in terms of processing power, speed of transactions, and energy efficiency.

4.4. CASE EXAMPLE
Private companies who desire to create their own BFT Blockchain system can use
the information presented in this study to design the physical architecture of their system
in terms of how many total nodes to include and how many to include in each decision to
maximize security while minimizing energy consumption and latency times. It is not
meant to provide a final “best” answer to a system set up, instead, its primary purpose is
to find a point that best balances the system organizer’s priority metrics.
Some companies are looking to set up BFT Blockchain networks in their supply
chains to record the handling of sensitive materials. In this case, the company is the
system organizer and determines their acceptable ranges for number of total nodes and
𝑁𝑑 and consult system technicians to determine approximate numbers of 𝑁𝑐 possible in
the system at a time. They could then use this model to obtain figures showing the
compromise probability of their transactions with their preferred parameters. Minor
alterations would then be made to the system setup to reach their optimal point.
This model is best tailored to Private Permissioned Blockchain networks where
all nodes on the network are pre-approved and can be monitored by the system organizer.
Certain companies, however, would prefer to share the system amongst partners where
system nodes are spread across the various companies in the system. This system setup is
known as a communal block chain, and could also be modeled similarly, but with a few
adjustments.
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Communal blockchains are the next logical step for this model, but more work
could be done to alter it such that it becomes applicable to a much wider variety of
system types to find their optimal setups as well. System developers are always looking
for ways to improve their systems. This model provides another way for them to do just
that.
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5. CONCLUSIONS

BFT System developers who need to optimize their networks without delving into
the inner workings of BFT algorithms should look to the methods shown in this research
to optimize their nodal arrangements. The results of this study show that transaction
disruption chance follows patterns that can be predicted statistically. By selecting a
number of decision nodes where 𝑁𝑑 Mod3=2, they can optimize their system energy
consumption while maintaining the lowest chance of transaction disruption.
While many believe that more decision nodes result in higher security, this
research shows that this is not the case for variable node systems. The largest source of
energy consumption in BFT networks comes from nodes running computations and
returning decisions for consensus. Adding nodes to the system also increases latency
times as there are more nodes requiring bandwidth and increasing the chance of
messaging delays. Increasing the decision nodes not only increases the energy usage of
the system and lengthens latency times, if it is increased to an amount not in the Mod3=2
group, it can actually decrease system security.
This research shows that administrators of variable node systems should consider
altering the amount of decision nodes they use in consensus. In some cases, it is even
preferable to counter-intuitively reduce decision nodes. If the decision node amount is not
in the Mod3=2 group, the system could drop nodes to an amount in the group and
increase security while simultaneously reducing energy costs and latency times. This
holds great potential for variable node system optimization.
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This method applies to Private Distributed BFT networks but, with some
alteration, should be able to be applied to a wider variety of network types. Other models
should be created to test its robustness and other factors such as differentiating between
malicious and non-malicious faulty nodes.

31
APPENDIX

1. EXPERIMENT 1 CODE

library(tidyverse)
library(plyr);library(dplyr)
library(openxlsx)
library(rio)
library(combinat)
library(RcppAlgos)
library(writexl)
#Total Nodes
N = 100
#Decision Nodes
n =10
#Compromised Node information
a <- ceiling((n-1)/3)
b <- N-(n+1)

m = a:b
k = 0:(a-1)
failure <- c(list, length(m))
for(i in a:b){
pmf = dhyper(k,i,N-i,n)
cbind(k,pmf)
failure[[i-(a-1)]] = 1- sum(pmf)
}
#png( paste(n," decision nodes out of ", N, " total nodes.png", sep="")
)
plot(m,unlist(failure),main = paste(n," decision nodes out of ", N, " t
otal nodes", sep=""), xlab = "Compromised Nodes", ylab = "Disruption Ch
ance")
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2. EXPERIMENT 2 CODE

library(tidyverse)
library(openxlsx)
library(rio)
library(RcppAlgos)
library(writexl)
library(ggplot2)
library(colorspace)
library(ggpubr)
#
#
#
#

N:
n:
m:
k:

Total Nodes
Decision Nodes
Total number of Compromised Nodes
number of compromised nodes selected

#set info
#Total Nodes
N = 100
tempn=5 #starting point for iterations
start=5 #starting point not iterated
n=tempn:N
m = 33
#k = 0
iterations <- n
failureA <- c(list, length(iterations))
failureB <- c(list, length(iterations))
failureC <- c(list, length(iterations))
DecNodesA <- c(list, length(iterations))
DecNodesB <- c(list, length(iterations))
DecNodesC <- c(list, length(iterations))
A=1
B=1
C=1
failure <- c(double,length(n))

for(i in n){
k <-

(0:(ceiling((tempn-1)/3)-1))

33
if((ceiling((tempn-1)/3)-1)>m){
failure[[i-(start-1)]] <-0
}else{
failure[[i-(start-1)]] <- 1-sum(dhyper(k,m,N-m,i))
if( i%%3 == 0){
failureA[[A]] <-1-sum(dhyper(k,m,N-m,i))
DecNodesA[[A]] <- i
A=A+1
}else if(i%%3 == 1){
failureB[[B]] <-1-sum(dhyper(k,m,N-m,i))
DecNodesB[[B]] <- i
B=B+1
}else if(i%%3 == 2){
failureC[[C]] <-1-sum(dhyper(k,m,N-m,i))
DecNodesC[[C]] <- i
C=C+1
}else{
print("ERROR")
}

}
tempn=tempn+1
k=NULL
}
plot(n,unlist(failure),main = paste(m," compromised nodes out of ", N,
" total nodes", sep=""), xlab = "Decision Nodes", ylab = "Disruption Ch
ance",xlim=c(0,N), ylim=c(0.4,0.85))
plot(DecNodesA, failureA, main= paste("Mod3=0: ",m,":Comp Nodes,", N, "
:Total Nodes", sep=""), xlab = "Decision Nodes", ylab = "Disruption Cha
nce",xlim=c(0,N), ylim=c(0.4,0.85))
plot(DecNodesB, failureB, main= paste("Mod3=1: ",m,":Comp Nodes,", N, "
:Total Nodes", sep=""), xlab = "Decision Nodes", ylab = "Disruption Cha
nce",xlim=c(0,N), ylim=c(0.4,0.85))
plot(DecNodesC, failureC, main= paste("Mod3=2: ",m,":Comp Nodes,", N, "
:Total Nodes", sep=""), xlab = "Decision Nodes", ylab = "Disruption Cha
nce",xlim=c(0,N), ylim=c(0.4,0.85))
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